

ARGUN HILD

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Contact	L7 3-5, 4 th Floor Mannheim, 68161 Germany +49 15737297379	
Education	University of Mannheim Ph.D. in Economics, 2020 – 2026 (expected) <i>Research visit:</i> Stockholm School of Economics, February – May 2025 Central European University M.A. in Economics (<i>distinction</i>), 2020 ADA University B.Sc. in Economics, 2018	
Fields	Primary Field: Behavioral and Experimental Economics Secondary Fields: Labor, Political Economy	
References	Henrik Orzen University of Mannheim henrik.orzen@uni-mannheim.de	Wladislaw Mill University of Mannheim mill@uni-mannheim.de
	Anna Dreber Almenberg Stockholm School of Economics anna.dreber@hhs.se	Guido Friebe Goethe University Frankfurt gfriebe@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de
Relevant Experience	Researcher, Market Design Department, ZEW Mannheim, 2023–Present Teaching Assistant, Economics Department, University of Mannheim, 2023–Present Research Assistant, Economics Department, CEU, 2019–2020	
Job Market Paper	Competing Against Stereotypes: Stereotyped Beliefs and Willingness to Compete (with Michael Hilweg-Waldeck)	

Career choice, earnings, and other key economic outcomes have been linked to gender differences in willingness to compete. This paper examines how gender stereotypes shape these differences. We conduct a meta-study of prior work and demonstrate that the wide variation in gender competition gaps can be explained by stereotypes: Men enter competitions more in traditionally male-stereotyped domains, whereas in female-stereotyped domains, the gap is smaller or even reversed. Importantly, these differences are not explained by gender gaps in performance. To explore mechanisms, we collect belief data in an elicitation experiment. We find that stereotyped beliefs about gender performance differences explain more than half of the variation in competition gaps in the literature. Next, we experimentally manipulate stereotypes through framing and informational cues about others' beliefs. Although these interventions significantly shift beliefs, the effects do not translate into changes in competitive behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of stereotypes in shaping gender gaps in competitiveness while suggesting that shifting beliefs alone is unlikely to close these gaps without deeper or longer-term interventions.

Working Paper

Why Don't Donors Deduct? Social Norms and the Limits of Tax Incentives

(with Michael Hilweg-Waldeck)

Many donors leave tax benefits unclaimed even when doing so requires minimal effort and yields meaningful financial rewards. Findings from our representative survey point to confusion about how to deduct donations and to misperceived social norms about the moral appropriateness of doing so as the main drivers of this gap. We study how to tackle these two sources of the deduction gap by providing concise information on how to deduct donations and a one-sentence norm cue in an online experiment ($n = 483$), a door-to-door field experiment with address-level randomization ($n = 6,728$), and a radio-based campaign spanning two Austrian federal states. We find that almost all donors deduct when donating through the anonymous online tool. By contrast, during face-to-face fundraising, where social-image concerns are salient, fewer than 1 in 100 donors choose to do so. Across settings, information on how to deduct donations alone leaves deduction behavior unchanged, whereas combining this information with the norm cue increases take-up in the door-to-door setting. Our findings show that financial incentives can falter when clashing with misperceived norms in social settings, unless paired with campaigns that reshape those norms.

Papers in Progress

Non-Standard Choice and Matching

(with Gian Caspari, Vincent Meisner, Michael Hilweg-Waldeck), *data collection ongoing*

Choice mistakes arise when individuals' observed choices deviate from their underlying preferences, often due to cognitive overload or complex menus. This project studies such mistakes in matching markets through a controlled laboratory experiment. Participants face real-effort tasks bundled into menus of varying complexity. These are allocated via different assignment mechanisms, including classic serial dictatorship and a novel sequentialized variant. The design allows us to measure when and why mistakes occur and to evaluate how simplifying choice environments affects efficiency, stability, and incentive properties of market design.

Inequality as a Constraint on (Repugnant) Markets

(with Jakob Schmidhäuser), *working on draft*

Repugnant markets, such as organ sales, are often restricted even when they could raise efficiency. We study whether income inequality between transacting parties shapes public repugnance toward such exchanges. Using vignette experiments in the United States and Europe, we find clear cross country differences in baseline attitudes. Europeans show stronger repugnance concerns overall. They are more likely to judge kidney sales and surrogate motherhood as unacceptable, while they do not view prostitution as objectionable to the same degree as Americans, consistent with prevailing social norms. Across both samples, inequality between parties is a powerful predictor of repugnance. Transactions are viewed as most objectionable when a poor individual sells to a rich individual and least objectionable when both parties are rich. These results provide new evidence on how cultural norms and the direction of inequality shape acceptance of contested markets and can inform debates on the design of market regulation.

Teaching Experience

Business Economics I (Game Theory), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2025
Business Economics I (Game Theory), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2024
Business Economics II (IO), Teaching Assistant, Spring 2024
Business Economics II (IO), Teaching Assistant, Spring 2023

Awards

IAREP/ELSEVIER Best Student Paper, 2025

Seminars & Conferences	Chicago School in Experimental Economics, 2025 Western Economic Association International, 2025 Prague Conference on Behavioral Sciences, 2025 Valencia IMBESS, 2025 Florence MBEE, 2025 Stockholm School of Economics (Brown Bag), 2025 Stockholm University IIES (Brown Bag), 2025 Verona Experimental Meeting, 2024 Gender Gaps Conference, 2024 EER Summer School in Experimental Economics, 2024 Innsbruck Winter School on Credence Goods, 2022
Academic Service	HeiKaMaxY Workshop, 2024, organizer Conference on Research with and within Organizations, 2024, organizer
Contributions	Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A., and the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration (2024). Reproducibility in Management Science. <i>Management Science</i>
Languages	English, German, Azerbaijani, Turkish
Software Skills	Stata, R, Python, JavaScript, LaTeX, oTree
Citizenship	Azerbaijan (German naturalization expected February 2026)